AAA

#### KOMUNIKACIJSKI PROTOKOLI IN OMREŽNA VARNOST

#### AAA

- \* Authentication : who is actually the person (computer) we are talking to
- \* Authorization : does the person (computer) we are talking to have the necessary privileges to the source / use of service / ...
- Accoounting : who has at any time used a source/service/...

# Content

- authentication: what is it, how can it be implemented, protocols
- × authorization: how can it be implemented
- x recording: system recording
- × protocol for AAA
- Literature: C. Kaufman, R. Perlman, M. Speciner. Network Security – Private Communication in a Public World. Prentice Hall.

# Authentication

trust,

trust,
trust,
trust,
trust,
trust,
trust,
trust,
trust,
trust,
trust . trust . trust

# Authentication

 two sides (Ana and Borut) are communicating and they must believe that they are actually talking to each other

- + establishing identities at the beginning
- + maintaining identity throughout the conversation
- how can we believe that the other side is in fact the correct side
- a side can be a person or service / program
- Ana needs to know:
  - something about Borut, with which she can recognize  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{Borut}}$
  - that "something" must only be known to Ana

# authentication with passwords

- \* Borut tells Ana his password
- × possible attacks:
  - + tapping (stealing inside transfer)
  - breaking into the system (stealing saved passwords)
    guessing passwords
- × defences:
  - using safe cryptographic connections
  - system / password security
  - limiting the number of trys for password guessing
- additional defence
- + Ana sends Borut a challenge which he must be able to solve

# storing passwords

- passwords are being stored in all places where they are needed
  - + huge vulnerability, the problem of changing
  - passwords are stored in one place and used by all users
  - + protection of transferring a copied to user
  - we have a special node that provides service for checking password
  - special protocol

# storing passwords

- \* We additionaly protect stored passwords with cryptographic protection
- we don't store passwords in their original form, instead we use safeguarded unidirectional hash function f
  - + authentication:
    - Borut calculates f(password) -> g
    - Borut sends g
    - Ana keeps in database g and not the password. She

only checks its presence g in database (this is the correct translation)

# attacks on password

- **\*** By guessing: we limit the number of attempts
  - + automaton occupies the card;
  - + password is valid for a limited amount of attempts
- × Limiting how long the password is valid:
  - The S/KEY One-Time Password System, RFC1760
     A One-Time Password System, RFC2289
    - $\star$  required: find it on the internet and read about it ii
      - challenge: write your own program for S/Key or invent your OTP.

# attacks on password

#### × Stealing passwords

- + stolen blind text change the password + Stolen mappings
- On the internet there are databases/services, which sistematicly calculate password mappings
  - possible defense- we salten the password challenge: how to performe saltening?

# address as the password

× (IP) address represents a password or a part of it

+ We trust only certain computers

× Loging is possible only from those computers

- We trust those computers, that they finished
- appropriate authentication (file hosts.equiv, )
- Only those computers are allowed to authenticate required: Consider how to address the authentication at ssh?

# trusted intermediaries

- × key distribution centre
- + Broker forms a key (password) for every new connection
- Short-lived keys
- certification authority
- Broker provides authorized passwords
- Long-lived certificates, must have option to cancel it Hierarchy of intermediaries

# authentication people

- × Using passwords
- × Authentication utility
- × Using biometric characteristics
- Two other options require additional hardware (which we have to trust)

# passwords

- \* Password must not be simple: length, number of characters, which sings , ..
- + admin/admin, 1234, unique master citizen number
   \* Password must not be too complicated
- + NaWUwra66nu5UHAd <sup>®</sup> × challenge: Find a system that generates safe passwords.
- We change passwords systematicly
- What if we forget a password?

# authentication devices

× cards

- Only holders of informations (magnetic recording, optical recording, ...)
- × Smart cards
  - They contain a computer that protects information , we need a password to access the computer...
     Use of challenge
- Cryptographic computers
  - + They form a time-depended passwords

# biometric features

- × Replacable password
- × lack of portability
- routine, fingerprint, face identificatio, iris, voice, .

# authentication process

× directly

- + Loging to a computer console
- + Remote access: telnet (TELNET Protocol, RFC 139), ssh (Does RFC exist for ssh?)
  - $\times$  challenge: find other RFC documents about telnet.
- × ad hoc form
- Using protocols

# protocols for authentication

- \* PPP in PAP: Password authentication protocol
- CHAP: Challenge-handshake authentication protocol (MS-CHAP)
- × EAP: Extensible Authentication Protocol

# PPP IN PAP

- The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP), RFC 1661 + challenge: find and read RFC.
- × It is replacing data-link layer
- Authentication required at the beginning of sessions



#### PAP

- × Password transfer in cleantext
- Last option, if all other fail (and if we are still willing to do it)

#### CHAP

- PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP), RFC 1994
   \* required: find this protocol on the internet and read it -literaturel
- × Prepared for PPP use (poin to point protocol)
- Challenge-based design that Ana sends to Borut
- Transmission protocol in principle is not defined (see PPP)

#### CHAP

- Three-step protocol:
  - 1. Ana sends a challenge
  - 2. Borut combines the challenge with a password and sends it back encrypted with a one-way hash function
  - 3. Ana verifies the if the answer is correct
- Steps in PPP protocol can be repeated for unlimited number of times
- Challenge is sent in a readable form
- password must be stored on both sides
   because the challenge is changing, it is difficult to attack with repeating

# which hash function

- ppp protocol has its own control protocol LCP
   it can set various properties and also the type
- of a hash function + challenge: where and how can we set it?



#### **MS-CHAP**

- Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2, RFC 2759
  - + challenge: find it on the internet and read it; how is a password change conducted and what do we have to be careful of?
- There are two versions
   + required: how is the first version different from the second one?
- Based on the CHAP protocol with two fundamental appendices:
  - + mutual authentication
  - + The ability to change paswords

#### EAP

 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), RFC 3748 - the basic protocol and corrections RFC5247

#### + challenge: find and read RFC

- Framework for protocols and not a real protocol because it defines only the message format
- usually directly over the data-link layer
   (ppp, IEEE 802 ethernet) and also UDP, TCP
   + challenge: In RFC find which protocol is using UDP
  - Forwarding possibility Authentication Server

# **EAP-base operation**

- \* The client and the server (authenticator) make an agreement about the type of authentication.
- Step-protocol: 4
  - Authenticator sends a request for data; ex. identification, request for authentication including the type of authentication
  - client confirms or refuses the way of
  - authentication
  - steps 1. and 2. are repeated until the server identifies the client

# EAP-shape package

- Code | Tdentifier | Length

# request/response package type - what does authenticator request and how does client respond - 1 Identity - 2 Notification - 3 Nak (Response only) - 4 MD5-Challenge - 5 One Time Password (OTP) - 6 Generic Token Card (GTC) - 254 Expanded Types - 255 Experimental use

identical to CHAP

# authorization

- \* when the user is authenticated (identified), we can check the rights that the user has
- × on Unix systems usually becomes a member of a group or multiple groups, that have certain rights (group)
- Similiar on MS windows systems
  - challenge: there is a RFC 2904, AAA Authorization Framework. What's it about and does it define some requirements or something else?

# **Access Authorization Matrix**

- \* access matrix specifies the rights of the individual user groups
  - + capability list
  - + access control list
- stored locally in the file/files
- similar problems as with password storage
- stored on the server
  - challenge: How is the safety of downloaded messages and their encription?

# record

- × system that will record contents of events and where and when they occurred
- Common recording form on operation systems is syslog (POSIX standard)
- Standardized also with IETF as RFC 5424, The Syslog Protocol.
  - challenge: compare RFC with "man -k syslog" sites?
  - challenge: find other RFCs about Syslog and IETF site, where Syslog working group published documents.

# record and syslog

- Log is stored in file /var/log ...:
  - Nov 13 17:00:17 svarun0 sshd[92530]: error: PAM: authentication error for root from ip-62-129-164-36.evc.net
  - possible message levels: Emergency, Alert, Critical, Error, Warning, Notice, Info or Debug challenge: See the files in /var/log/...

### software

- × on FreeBSD syslogd
- configuration in /etc/syslog.conf - challenge: change the configuration so that all messages will be stored in / var / log / super-log; how to send a note to another computer?; and can we store the same note to multiple locations?

security.\*
auth.info;authpriv.info
mail.info
lpr.info
ftp.info
cron.\*

/var/log/security /var/log/auth.log /var/log/maillog /var/log/lpd-errs /var/log/xferlog /var/log/cron

#### SYSLOG PROTOKOL

× Internal architecture distributes: Message form and their content (RFC 5424) Message form and their content (RFC 3424)
 Way of message transmision (RFC 5425)
 \* required: find RFC 5425 and look for which ingre
 of-literaturel
 \* challenge: find other RFCs that talk about syslog. lients it speaks

# | contait | contait | | ryilog application | ryilog application | coriginator, | | ryilog transport | ryilog transport | transport sender, | ryilog transport | ryilog transport | (transport receiver)

# Syslog protokol- oblika sporočila UF SHA APP-NAME = NILVALUE / 1\*48PRINTUSASCI PROCID = NILVALUE / 1\*128PRINTUSASCI MSGID = NILVALUE / 1\*82PRINTUSASCI HEAD - HEADALLE / 1-127HATUARDOI THARSTAND - HEADALLE / 1-127HATUARDOI THARSTAND - HEADALLE / 1-127HATUARDOI DOTE-MALTOR - ADARI DOTE-MALTOR - ADARIT MEMOLINE - ADARIT THARSHALL - ADARIT MEMOLINE = MSG-ANY / MSG-UTF8 = \*OCTET ; not starting with BOM = BOM UTF-8-STRING = \*OCTET ; UTF-8 string as specified \*C 3629

#### **PROTOKOL RADIUS**

× defined in RFC 2865, Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) and RFC 2866, RADIUS Accounting

ed: find it on the in rnet and re ad about it - I challenge: find other RFC documents that deal with tftp and check what it say in them.

#### basic functionalities:

- authentication, authorization, recording
- It can use other protocols for authentication
- Look also at RFC 4962, Guidance for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management

# **RADIUS** basic architecture

\* three parties involved: user of a service

- Service provider service provider: NAS, Network access server, which is also RADIUS client

**RADIUS server** 

RADIUS server can also only be an interface for an access to the second RADISU server





-	

# Radius-request for access

- × Access Request message
- Diffrent protocols PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, EAP
   + challenge: look at how MS-CHAP is supported; RFC
   2548, Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes.
   + challenge: how is the support for EAP?

# **Radius-denial**

- × Access Reject message
- × various reasons:
  - + incorrect password / username, ...
  - + inadequate rights
  - + further clarification may be in the message

# **Radius-challenge**

- × Access Challenge message
- \* additional password or message in different cases:
  - + different password,
  - + PIN code
  - + established tunnel between the user and
  - authenticator, ...
  - Something else ...

# **Radius-confirmed**

- × Access Accept message
- RADIUS menu, that access is confirmed / authorized
  - + Both the password / username as authorization
  - message can bring additional information, which NAS needs to set up services (IP address, how to establish L2TP tunel, ...); depending on the service
    NAS may obtain additional information from other services- files, LDAP, ...

# Radius- middleserver and areas

- × proxy
- \* distribution of users to areas (spheres) (realm)
- area is defined by any set of letters, which is usually similar to the domain name
   peter.zmeda@butale.isp
  - ×andrej.brodnik@fri.uni-lj.si
  - Each area has its own RADIUS server

# Radius- middleserver and hosting

- × roaming
- the service provider can via the RADIUS server
   allow hosting of users from other domains in his own field
- user from another area may be granted the right to use a service(Authorization)
  - + Establishing collaboration among areas
    + authentication to another area

# Radius- middleserver and preintervention

- × proxy
- Connections beetwen servers can be safe (VPN)
- Middle server can transform the received request and send it to the right server (almost, see RFC 2865):
  - + Middle server encrypts the message and sends it to the parent server
  - Parent server returns the encrypted response × challenge: what can the middle server change and how?







#### **PROTOKOL RADIUS**

- \* defined commands(example. RPC, RMI):
  - + Access Request
  - + Access Reject, Access Challenge, Access Accept

+ Accounting Request

+ Accounting Response

each of the commands may have different additional features / parameters (*attributes*)

#### **PROTOKOL RADIUS**

- \* RFC expects UDP transport protocol
  - + RADIUS is a transaction protocol similar to http
  - + Communication is step by step
  - + Simplifying middle servers operations, because
  - they don't have open connections
- × UDP protocol is not safe
  - Transition to TCP/SSL
  - security on lower layers: using VPN (IPSec)

# Radius protocol - signing

- signature is called *autheticator* and it is the only source of ensuring the authenticity of the package sent
- NAS and RADIUS server share a common key secret (shared secret)

# Radius protocol - signing

- × Signing AA. packages:
  - + Client: 128-bit random number salt
  - + server (response): 128-bit number derived from the secret, package content and client salt
  - + signature is used as the response authentication and does not protect requirements of the client
     + salt in the client signature is also used as salt for protection of sent password

# Radius protocol - signing

- × signing .. A packages:
  - + Client: 128-bit number derived from secret and package content
  - + server (response): 128-bit number derived from the secret, signature of client-package and package content
  - signature protects the client's request for a recording (trying to)

# Radius protocol - Security

#### **×** Protection:

- + There is no protection against eavesdropping (hidding)
- + It's (partial) protection of the authenticity of sent packets
- + There is no protection against denial of sent contents

× challenge: find in-depth security analysis of RADIUS protocol??

# Radius protocol - Security

× Attacks:

+ attack by repeating

Code | Identifier | Length

Attributes ...

- + Middle-attacker attack
- + difference whether it is AA. part or ... A part
- how is it with the distribution of secret and how is it distributed between the server and clients
- challenge: lookat how handshaking with secret works?

# Radius protocol - form package

# Code – code command: (1) Access-Request

- (2) Access-Accept
- (3) Access-Reject
- (4) Accounting-Request(5) Accounting-Response
- (11) Access-Challenge (12) Status-Server (trial)
- (13) Status-Client (trial) (255) Reserved

# Radius protocol - form package

- 6 1 2 3 0 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 1 Code 1 Restfer Leigh 1 Asthesicator 1 | Attributes ...
- Identifier RADIUS protocol is a step-by-step protocol and client must know the answer to any request received. Length – length of the entire packet including the header in bytes
  - minimum length is 20 and the largest 4096 if the package is larger, it is reduced to length, if it is shorter, it is discarded

# Radius protocol - form package

- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 1 Code 1 Zdentifier | Eesyth |
- Autheticator "signature" of package of lenght 16 bytes: AA. request: 128 bit random number AA. response: MD5(Code ID Length RequestAuth Attributes Secret)
- Attributes ...
- . A request: MD5(Code ID Length 00<sup>16</sup> Attributes Secret) ...A response: MD5(Code ID Length RequestAuth Attributes Secret)
- operation is contact (concatenation)

# Radius protocol - form package Attributes - Additional Code | Identifier | Length | parameters of the Authenticator command that was sent

# **Protocol-Radius attributes**

- × number of possible attributes is 256
- \* request: the users must have the option of adding their own attributes
- × Values of attributes are to be arbitrary: number, date, time, string, ...

# **Radius attributes**

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Type | Length | Value ...

# TLV record Type - which attribute it is Length - number of bytes to record the value of the attribute Value - value of attribute • text: UTF-8 encoded, length greater than 0 and a maximum length of 256 bytes • series: an arbitrary string, ength greater than 0 and a maximum length of 256 bytes • Address: 32-bit recording • Integer: 32 bit recording • Integer: 32 bit recording • Time: 32 bit recording • Time: 32 bit recording • Co:00:00 1.1.1970 UTC (standard attributes do no use)

# **Protocol Radius- attributes**

× Attributes walk-through:

- +(1) User-Name
- +(2) User-Password
- + (3) CHAP-Password

# Protocol Radius - attributes: password

- × Password is encrypted using salt in authenticator (RA) and shared secret (S):
  - + Password is divided into 128-bit parts p [1. n]
  - + b[1]= MD5(S RA); c[1]= p[1] XOR b[1]
  - + b[i]= MD5(S c[i-1]); c[i]= p[i] XOR b[i]

# Protocol-Radius attributes

- × Attributes walk-through:
- (4) NAS-IP-Address
- (5) NAS-Port
- (6) Service-Type
- (7) Framed-Protocol
- (8) Framed-IP-Address
- (9) Framed-IP-Netmask
- (10) Framed-Routing
- (11) Filter-Id
- (12) Framed-MTU
- (13) Framed-Compression
- (19) Callback-Number (20) Callback-Id (21) (unassigned)(22) Framed-Route(23) Framed-IPX-Network

× (14) Login-IP-Host × (15) Login-Service

× (16) Login-TCP-Port

× (17) (una × (17) (unassigned) × (18) Reply-Message

(24) State

#### **Protocol-Radius attributes** × Attributes walk-through: × (36) Login-LAT-Group × (37) Framed-AppleTalk-Link (25) Class(26) Vendor-Specific(27) Session-Timeout (38) Framed-AppleTalk-Network (28) Idle-Timeout × (39) Framed-AppleTalk-Zone (29) Termination-Action(30) Called-Station-Id (31) Calling-Station-Id × (40-59) recording (32) NAS-Identifier (60) CHAP-Challenge (33) Proxy-State(34) Login-LAT-Service(35) Login-LAT-Node (61) NAS-Port-Type (62) Port-Limit (63) Login-LAT-Port



# Protocol Radius - recording

 Acct-Status-Type and Acct-Session-Id serve to support the record within one session on the service offered by NAS

	RADIUS Client	RADIUS Sen
status:	RADIUS: Accounting	-Request
•(1) Start	PADIUS: Accounting	Personne
•(2) Stop		(applied)
•(3) Interim-Update	RADIUS: Accounting	Request
<ul> <li>(7) Accounting-On</li> </ul>	[acct_status_type=inte	im update]
•(8) Accounting-Off	RADIUS:Accounting-	Response
•(9-14) Reserved for Tunnel		
Accounting	RADIUS: Accounting [acct_status_type	Request
•(15) Reserved for Failed	RADIUS:Accounting-	Response

## software

- × On FreeBSD (Linux): freeradius
- \* configuration in the/usr/local/etc/radiusd.conf
  - + challenge: find the manual and just set a file and run the server.
  - + challenge: where is the shared secret stored and how it is shared between the server and clients?
    + challenge: where are notes being kept?
  - + challenge: how can RADIUS use other services for authentication

## DIAMETER

- Defined in RFC 3588, Diameter Base Protocol in RFC 5719, 5729
  - required: find it on the internet and read about it literaturel
     challenge: find the remaining RFC documents dealing with tftp and check what it says in them.
- Primarily security response to the RADIUS
   is not entirely consistent with the RADIUS

#### DIAMETER

- × differences between RADIUS and DIAMETER:
  - + More secure transmission protocols (TCP, ...)
  - + integrated network security (SSL, IPsec)
    + More attributes are possible (32-bit)
- × Software: freeDiameter