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organizations whether they belong or not. The second invention is the community picnic. These outings are the high points in the summer schedule and draw large crowds. In them, too, simple Syrianism finds an enjoyable expression.

There is no satisfactory forum, however, for the expression of nationalistic sentiments at a sophisticated level. There is no folk school where children may be taught Arabic and the culture of their forefathers. There is talk of organizing classes for the serious study of Syrian history, but nothing has yet come of it. Few colleges offer the opportunity to become well acquainted with the problems of the Near East and its contributions to civilization. The Syrian Women's Club, to be sure, devotes some of its meetings to the discussion of Syrianism. The propagandists for the Arab League are accused of turning every meeting of their compatriots into a political rally. A pilgrimage to Syria and Lebanon gave the fortunate few a first-hand impression of recent developments in their country of origin.

It would seem, however, that the collectivity is most responsive to the intermingling of American and Syrian symbolism as, for example, at the annual conventions of the Syrian and Lebanese Federation of the Eastern States. American culture provides the formal ends for such an organization and techniques for their achievement, while Syrian culture adds the colorful dances and pageantry that make for vivid enjoyment.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, it appears difficult to fit Syrianism into what Durkheim calls *la vie serieuse*. There is, in a sense, no moral justification for its continuance in the United States. American apologists claim that it performs a temporary function in easing the tensions of a group in transition from one culture to another, but that its preservation for any considerable length of time would be dysfunctional, for one reason because ethnicity is one basis for discrimination. Some Syrians accept this point of view. Others press for the right to follow a way of life that they find enjoyable though only at home and among their compatriots. It would be inappropriate, they feel, to make a display of it before strangers. Still others argue that the United States is a land of tolerance for diverse cultures, but tolerance can be practised only in the continued presence of diversity. Syrianism would be preserved, almost as a museum piece, to prove that it can be preserved. Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is that life is patterned differently if it is regarded as an end in itself than if it is looked upon as an instrumentality.

SOCIAL CONTROL AND SELF-REGULATION

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I

NO ONE will quarrel with the assertion that social existence is controlled existence, for we all accept a certain basic assumption about human nature—namely, that without some constraint of individual leanings the coordination of action and regularity of conduct which turn a human aggregation into a society could not materialize. It is thus true to say that "the concept of social control brings us to the focus of sociology and its perpetual problem—the relation of the social order and the individual being, the relation of the unit and the whole."[1]

[1] R. M. MacIver and Charles Page, *Society* (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1949), p. 137.

The question arises where this control resides. Clearly, the social order as such already constrains or controls; institutions, mores, patterned relationships, and all the other constituents of social existence prescribe modes of thought and action and hence canalize and curb individual leanings. In this sense control is simply coterminous with society, and in examining the former we simply describe the latter. Many sociologists choose such a broad interpretation. To quote from MacIver: "A very large part of sociological literature, *by whatever name* [my italics], treats of social control. . . . To study social control we must seek out the ways in which society patterns and regulates individual behaviour. . . ."[2]

[2] *Ibid.*

Yet the fact that institutions, mores, and so forth, operating as they do upon potentially intractable human material, can maintain themselves and have stability suggests that there must be further controls, safeguarding their continuance. These further controls are, of course, well known. They are exemplified in legal sanctions, in procedures of enforcement, and in any formalized apportionment of rewards and punishments, that is, in all institutions specifically designed to buttress the accepted norms of behaviour and coming into play for no purposes other than appropriate encouragement or restraint. So understood, the social controls no longer simply coincide with social existence but represent a special province within it and a special machinery outside the particular order they are meant to protect.

Anthropologists will tend to adopt this narrower definition, for they would lay that other, more immediate and pervasive control of human nature into their concept of culture or custom. For example, "The social controls found in a culture ... are a body of customs by which the behaviour of the participants is regulated so that they conform to the culture."[3] This seems the more profitable viewpoint, especially since it brings out the diversity of the processes involved, culture "moulding" or "canalizing" human drives, needs, or desires, while controls reinforce conformity and block deviance.

Viewed in this fashion the anthropological field is rich in instances demonstrating that societies keep their orderliness and cultures, their character even, though controls may be weakly developed or even absent. This suggests, then, that social systems or cultures must in some measure be self-sustaining. The familiar reference to the "force of custom," often taken to be paramount in primitive society, probably always has this implication. But it can be argued, more generally, that no society or culture can be without some elements of self-regulation and that any other assumption leads to absurd consequences; for if all cultural modes of thought and action, in order to function adequately, need specific controls, we might well ask what is controlling the controls, and so on *ad infinitum*.

What follows is an attempt to describe and specify the main elements of self-regulation. The first point to be made is that little is gained by adducing the force of custom and tradition, that is, the sheer inertia of habitual behaviour and inherited practices. At least, this force is not a final, irreducible datum.

[3] J. S. Slotkin, *Social Anthropology* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. 525.

II

Traditional behaviour, perpetuated through the habituations of long practice, has been numbered among the basic and irreducible types of social action by no less an authority than Max Weber[4]; yet it is doubtful if it can thus stand on its own, at least as regards conduct of any consequence.[5] Rather, traditional or customary behaviour operates reliably only when two other conditions apply and derives its force and apparent self-propulsion from them. Either acting in accordance with tradition (i.e., in accordance with old inherited models) is as such considered desirable and good; or, this way of acting happens also to be safe, known routine. In the first case the traditional action is also value-oriented, being indeed short-lived without this support, as is instanced by changing fashions and fads. In the second case the custom remains such because its routinized procedure affords maximum success with least risk. It is, I suggest, in these two conditions that we find the true elements of self-regulation.

This conclusion is borne out by a further consideration. It must not be assumed that custom (as now understood) takes care only of the less important features of social life while those relevant or crucial are safeguarded by specific controls. In the kind of society anthropologists mostly study, this is certainly not true, custom and tradition governing a wide field of conduct and, within it, activities of great relevance. Indeed, it can be shown that in primitive societies the specific controls, far from being indispensable in safeguarding important activities, tend to be weakest in their case. In other words, any activity which is socially important may by this very fact already be protected from deviance or neglect.

There is nothing surprising or paradoxical in

[4] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 105.

[5] Weber only admits that the "pure type" of traditional behaviour (as of all the other basic modes of action) is rarely met with in concrete situations; there, it will tend to shade over into or overlap with the other types, especially with "value-oriented" action.

this assertion once we are clear on what we mean by "social importance." There are various criteria for its assessment, of which two are relevant in this context. First, an important social activity is stated to be such by the actors; the criterion therefore lies in the value judgments and convictions of the people we study. Secondly, from the observer's point of view, the importance of any social activity is established by its focal position among all the other social activities; more precisely, any activity is important to the extent to which a series of others depend on it, in a practical and instrumental sense, being incapable of achievement without the focal activity or impeded by any variation (through neglect or disregard) in the latter. This nexus in turn rests on the multivalence of social activities. By this term I mean, briefly, the capacity of any activity (to the extent to which it is focal) to serve also ends or interests other than the one for which it is explicitly or primarily designed. Examples will presently be quoted.[6]

As regards the first criterion of importance, I shall attempt to show that convictions about values have sufficient force to sustain and direct behaviour with no aid other than that implied in the second criterion. And as regards this, it includes self-regulation by definition; for the more focal any mode of behaviour, the more strongly it is rendered invariant by the aggregate pressure of all the other activities and interests dependent on it—lest indeed social life, or a wide area within it, become dislocated. Adherence to the prescribed (and important) norm of action is thus, once more, adherence to a safe procedure, both for the society at large and for the individual actor.

That the two supports of self-regulation—notions of value and instrumental nexus—hang together has already been suggested. They can in fact be regarded as complementary, for if values imply positive guidance for action, the effect of the instrumental nexus is to impede deviance from given courses of action. It will be more convenient to begin with the discussion of the latter.

III

In prototype form, the instrumental nexus appears also in single activities; for any mode of action which is an appropriate means to a given end tends to become routinized and self-maintaining for that reason. This principle (exemplified already in the psychological "law of effect" governing elementary learning processes) is essentially one of economy, in effort and trial-and-error; and the most convincing instances in social life probably come from the field of technology and economics in general. But aesthetic and recreational activities are similarly self-regulating, for any artistic style will again be perpetuated as long as it represents an adequate means for its particular end (the desired satisfaction or stimulation). The infrequency of technological invention in primitive societies provides the broadest evidence of this kind. If it be argued that this proves, not the self-maintenance of adequate methods, but a primitive, tradition-bound mentality, which prevents people from exploring new and possibly better procedures, the answer is this: primitive peoples are disinterested only in inventiveness, in experimentation with new techniques, not in innovations as such. Significantly, they have little hesitation in copying (or borrowing) novel methods, that is, in adopting them when they can be seen *in use*. The pull of tradition, then, means in fact reluctance to abandon a safe routine for the risks that go with untried methods.

Why this factor should be more powerful in primitive than in advanced societies we need not discuss. But it must be mentioned that in the former the tenacity of inherited routines, technological or aesthetic, is often reinforced by sanctification. Now this means that the routine is invested with an additional value of sacredness or of desirability in virtue of divine derivation and the like; and this means, further, that the technological or aesthetic task is meant to serve more than one interest. For it is now required to attain its own intrinsic goal as well as conform to religious commands, lest the actors forfeit some expected benefit, imaginary (supernatural protection) or real (the normal fellowship which might be refused to the irreligious). We note that this is already a first instance of that more far-reaching self-regulation which we derived from

[6] The "multivalence" of social activities has been described in various terms. Malinowski used to speak in a similar context of "amalgamation of functions." Recently Firth referred to the "concern" which an "action or relation has for all other elements in the social system in which it appears"; see Raymond Firth, *Elements of Social Organization* (London: Watts, 1951), p. 35. See also S. F. Nadel, *Foundations of Social Anthropology* (London: Cohen and West, 1951), pp. 123–124, 137–138.

the interdependence of diverse social activities and from multivalence or focal position.

IV

Any mode of behaviour operating also as a *diacritical sign* (i.e., a differentiating sign or symbol) is multivalent to a simple degree. Thus customs of dress, eating habits, style of residence or manners of speech, apart from attaining their intrinsic ends (protection of the body, satiation of hunger, shelter, communication), will often also indicate a person's social status, group or class membership, and generally his social relationship with others. The continuance of these indicative modes of behaviour is thus reinforced by the importance of the state of affairs they indicate. Or, in terms of individual behaviour, individuals will keep up a certain dialect, manner of dress, and so forth, in order to evince their status and group membership and, implicitly, to qualify for the benefits that go with them.

We note that the additional valence of the activities in question attaches to their form or style, not to the efficiency with which they are performed and attain their intrinsic ends. In other instances it is the latter which has the double valence, in the sense that efficiency in the performance of one activity becomes a qualification for participation in a second, desired one. Among the Nupe of West Africa, for example, a man whose sons are guilty of a serious misdemeanour cannot hope to be appointed to a rank and title[7]; among a certain Nuba tribe in the Sudan a candidate for shaman priestship will be unsuccessful if he happens to be a lazy or unsuccessful farmer.[8] We might here, briefly, speak of an incentive or premium meant to ensure the socially approved conduct.

Examples of this kind can easily be multiplied. But it is important to emphasize that the incentive is incidental, not specific, and that the rewarding achievement is such—a premium—only among other things. If it were not so, we should be dealing with a specific machinery of control, not with features of self-regulation. Nupe society is not otherwise concerned with the success of parental discipline (save in approving of it), and the bestowal of ranks and titles implies other, more relevant, qualifications besides; the Nuba tribe does not reward good farmers and punish bad ones, and again expects would-be shamans to give more substantial proof of their eligibility. All that happens is that parental discipline or diligent farming is linked with the other desired achievements, failures in the former reducing the chances of the latter. Differently expressed, deviations from the socially approved conduct are *penalized* (not punished). The step from one to the other, though narrow, is unmistakable. We need only think of the exclusion from sacramental offices of sinners or of the loss of civil rights threatening political criminals.

It is clear that the efficacy of such linked incentives requires a closely geared social system. In our examples the public standards of conduct are affected only because every man is both a family head and a potential rank-holder, a farmer and a possible candidate for priestship. The linkage itself presupposes that rank and priestship are conceived sufficiently broadly for the specialized qualifications to be combined with other, extraneous ones. In more general terms, the regulative effects must vary inversely with the separation of social roles, with the specialization of offices and tasks, and, implicitly, with the size of groups (since only small groups can function adequately without considerable internal differentiation). It is precisely the small scale and lack of internal differentiation which characterize the societies we commonly call primitive and hence enable them to lean more heavily on such machinery of self-regulation.[9]

Its effects may be rendered both more pervasive and more unspecific, consisting in general complications and obstacles facing any person who would depart from the accepted norm. The premium, then, lies merely in the smoothly functioning, normal course of events individuals expect to encounter; the penalty, in normality dislocated and expectations disappointed. Some of the most crucial norms of conduct in primitive societies, such as exogamy or incest taboos, are often regulated by no more specific sanctions, secular or religious, yet are adhered to with great strictness.

[7] S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 64.

[8] S. F. Nadel, *The Nuba* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 442.

[9] Highly complex societies, too, exploit it whenever they are organized on "totalitarian" lines, e.g., when social promotion of any kind is impossible unless the candidate professes the "right" kind of religion of political conviction or lives according to approved standards of morality.

Consider for example, a society, patrilineally organized, where marriage is prohibited between aganatic kin, is contracted by the payment of brideprice, and entails specific duties towards the offspring on the part of both father's and mother's kin. If any man married in disregard of the first rule, the others would fail to work also. The brideprice would have to be paid within the same descent group, while in the people's conception it is a payment suitable only between such groups, being meant (among other things) to indemnify the bride's group for the loss of her prospective progeny. The offspring of such an irregular union would forfeit the double assistance from two kin groups since the father's and mother's kin now coincide, and would be less advantageously placed than the offspring of customary marriages. And there would be various other, minor but no less confusing, complications; for example, rules of avoidance (obligatory towards in-laws) and intimacy (towards blood relations) would now apply to the same people. In short, one breach of routine disrupts routine all round, and the individual is faced with a wide loss of social bearings.

It has been suggested that this type of marriage enables kinship affiliations to be extended beyond the single descent group and thus creates additional bonds consolidating an otherwise segmented society.[10] This, then, is one of the multivalences underlying the chain of effects just described: the institution of marriage, over and above regulating sex relations and procreation, also serves that other end, the strengthening of social solidarity. It is doubtful if the actors themselves think, or think clearly, in terms of this ulterior objective (or function). Yet if they are not capable of assessing this widest instrumental nexus, they are aware of the multiple consequences threatening them personally, and act from this knowledge.

This is only a restatement, from the actors' standpoint, of the point made before, that the crucial importance (or focal position) of any mode of action also protects it from deviation. Here, too, the character of self-regulation is most clearly marked. For consider that in the specific controls the disabilities (or sanctions) imposed upon the transgressor are mostly extrinsic to his mode of conduct, leaving the success of the latter unaffected. An adulterer, for example, though he may have to face flogging, a fine, or imprisonment, will have attained the satisfaction sought in the criminal act. In the instances here considered the penalty is intrinsic, lying in the incapacity of the criminal act to provide the expected satisfaction: the unorthodox marriage is simply an unsuccessful marriage judged by all the expectations it normally fulfils.

Quite often this notion of self-regulation by ill-success finds explicit expression. The potential transgressor will merely be warned of the frustrating and self-negating consequences of such-and-such a mode of action. The Navaho Indian, for example, "never appeals to abstract morality or to adherence to divine principles. He stresses mainly practical consequences: 'If you don't tell the truth, your fellows won't trust you and you'll shame your relatives. You'll never get along in the world that way'."[11] At least, statements of this kind will appear couched in terms of imagined, supernatural guarantees. Thus in a Nuba tribe incestuous marriages are said to remain barren, and the people would add, "Since one marries for the sake of children no one would break the marriage rules."[12] The Tikopia hold similar views and in fact explicitly state that incestuous marriages are doomed to failure or ill-success.[13] And proverbially there is the curse on ill-gotten gains.

We may finally consider the extreme case, when the loss of social bearings is very nearly complete. Here the transgressor is practically excluded from all normal expectations, left without a niche, and relegated to the role of a misfit. In primitive societies it is often unheard of for a man or woman to remain unmarried. Now this phrase "unheard of" indicates the pressure of the multiple consequences: the bachelor could reach no position of responsibility or authority; his economic pursuits would be seriously hampered in a society where the family is the main source of cooperative labour; he might have no one to look after him in sickness or old age, and no one even to bury him or perform the rites of the dead. In the Nuba society mentioned before, dissolution of marriage, though not unheard of, is considered most undesirable and in conflict with tradition.

[10] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 225.

[11] Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton, *The Navaho* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 218.

[12] S. F. Nadel, *The Nuba*, p. 430.

[13] Raymond Firth, *We, the Tikopia* (New York: American Book Company, 1936), p. 334.

In practice this means that the woman who leaves her husband can never enjoy normal life: her children would not be hers; she forfeits the support of her own kin; and she would die without the customary ceremonial.

Let me stress that these consequences still represent only ill-success, in the business of living, as it were, not genuine sanctions—disabilities specifically inflicted. The culprits merely suffer failures which, in a society so-and-so constituted, cannot be avoided once the rules are broken. There is no intentional discrimination against the offenders *qua* offenders; nor is there any thought of a stigma imposed on them (say, that of "living in sin") and ostracism because of this. Rather, as we shall see, stigmatization is on the whole alien to primitive societies.

V

Whenever we spoke above of desired, approved, good actions or their opposites we were, of course, already referring to values. Indeed, this concept, like that of social control, can be given so wide a connotation that it becomes coextensive with social existence or social behaviour. For since the latter is, by definition, regular and aimful behaviour, thus implying consistent choices between possible courses of action, social life in its entirety might be said to express or implement preferences and idiosyncrasies, notions of worthwhileness and undesirability, in short, values. This view is expressed, for example, by Lasswell and Kaplan: "A value is a desired event—a goal event"; "Conduct is goal-directed and hence implicates values."[14]

It is more profitable, however, to restrict the concept somewhat, in this sense. It shall be understood to refer to worthwhileness of a non-trivial kind (excluding, for example, table manners, fashions of dress, etc.); it shall not be coterminous with practical utility (e.g., of tools, technological procedures) but bear on more autonomous forms of worthwhileness (e.g., things morally good or aesthetically desirable); it shall refer to classes of objects (things, events, states of affairs desired or disdained), not to individual ones, so that it indicates maxims of action, not *ad hoc* preferences; and the former shall be ideologically founded, i.e., capable of being expressed by the actors in generalized assertions on right and wrong and the like.

It is clear and hardly worth saying that the specific controls found in any society inevitably imply values and normally refer to values widely accepted. What is important is that controls cannot ever be wholly effective unless they endorse what most people hold desirable (or value), which point is amply illustrated by the difficulties of enforcing laws no one believes in or of maintaining a hated regime. Even societies relying on machineries of control, then, must rely also on values simply held. Ultimately, the social norm has power inasmuch as it is internalized, that is, inasmuch as the public assertions on right and wrong are also the private convictions of individuals. In the language of psychoanalysis, the commands made on behalf of the society are absorbed in the Super-Ego.

We may for the moment disregard the processes whereby the Super-Ego is built up, through verbal instruction and the impact of models for acting. Nor need we emphasize again that in primitive societies it seems sufficiently powerful to determine conduct unaided by extraneous controls. But, as previously suggested, even where there are controls, their chain ends at some point; and here values simply held, internalized, will be the final pivots of desired conduct. In that sphere the observer can only state that, say, matrimonial sanctity or the observance of exogamy are held to be "right" or "good" and deviations from the norm, wrong or evil.

Sanctification will often obscure this self-reliance, deriving the final values from divine ordinances or some superhuman authority. Perhaps the religious guise, reducing as it does the absoluteness of the moral or social norm to quasi-human acts of will or providence, invests the norm with greater persuasiveness; at least, the acceptance of ultimate principles is moved back a further stage and joined to that other ultimate conception of an ordered universe. But in primitive societies this theological sophistication is often absent. There is no conception of deities as law givers; rather, they are merely the guardians and exponents of the moral principles. If they punish or reward they do so only because they are themselves subject to the given doctrine of good and evil. As Firth points out for the Tikopia, "The spirits, just as men, respond to a norm of conduct of an external character. The moral law exists in

[14] Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 16, 240.

the absolute, independent of the gods."[15] Indeed, the supreme deity may be altogether aloof from all moral concerns, while minor deities, spirits, or other mystic forces, would aid or hinder human action regardless of moral principles. Their influences are needed only to explain why "good" actions may fail and "evil" ones triumph, and hence to serve as a foil for the self-reliance of the accepted values. Furthermore, sanctification as such, making any object or action sacred, holy, or mystically "right," merely adds another notion of worthwhileness, no less final than the simple "good."

Yet even where supernatural sanctions are accepted, they clearly cannot be simply aligned with secular social controls. That punishment and reward will materialize, administered perhaps by an omniscient deity, is a question of faith, not of verifiable consequences; and this conviction is much closer to the internalized dictates of conscience than to the anticipation of public correctives or appraisals. Nor is it rare for the supernatural sanctions to be so conceived that they are entirely reduced to appeals to conscience. Among the Nuba tribes infringements of clan taboos or exogamy are sometimes believed to be punished with leprosy, which may unpredictably befall any descendant of the culprit. The potential sinner, then, will be restrained by the fear of bringing suffering and disgrace upon someone he does not even know, that is, by a further emphasis on the evilness of his deed.

In one respect belief in supernatural punishment differs sharply from internalized values. Any deed inviting the former, any sin, that is, can usually be expiated, the system of beliefs defining the sin also showing the procedure for regaining purity. But disregard of the dictates of conscience entails guilt, the awareness of which cannot be wiped out by established procedures. The conflict thus engendered must be resolved or borne by the individual alone and may well leave only escape into neurosis or suicide.[16] I do not know and can hardly imagine a society which relies exclusively on internalized commands and their correlate, guilt. That guilt is so often made translatable into sin reflects, I suggest, this risk—which no society can face—of denying to culprits all chances of expiation.

[15] Raymond Firth, *We, the Tikopia*, p. 335.

[16] Malinowski quotes several examples of suicide committed in consequence of such overwhelming awareness of guilt—"as means of escape from situations without issue"; see his *Crime and Custom* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1926), pp. 94 ff. Though these examples refer to a guilt reinforced by shame, i.e., brought into the open by direct or public accusation, this does not detract from the crucial guilt motive.

VI

We may, in the same light, assess the merits and demerits of self-regulation by "multiple consequences." Consider that any sanction proper (disregarding the extreme penalities of death, life imprisonment, and perhaps expulsion) limits the consequences of the crime to a single event, the punishment, and afterwards offers the culprit a new chance. But the obstacles and hardships the offender creates for himself when committing an unpunishable offense cannot be cut short by any single act of atonement. Though they may involve less physical suffering, they are more hopeless since there is no way of repairing that total loss of social bearings. The more widely a society relies on the automatic efficacy of this threat, the more severely are offenders imprisoned in their own actions. I know of no society completely commited to this method of self-regulation; but it is sufficiently powerful in some primitive groups to account for self-exile or even that ultimate means of escape, suicide.

Primitive societies are in this respect in a dilemma. As I have suggested, it is their smallness, low internal differentiation, and closely knit organization which afford the possibilities of far-reaching self-regulation; and it is precisely societies of this kind which are weakened most seriously by the loss of members. The adoption of specific mechanisms of control, therefore, apart from corresponding to the requirements of a less closely geared social system, also represents a loophole in a social system too rigidly and permanently penalizing transgression.

The underlying assumption, that primitive societies are aware of this risk and hence in some measure concerned with rehabilitating offenders, is easily proved. It is borne out by the widespread treatment of homicide almost as a "civil" offense, so that even murderers can, after payment of *wergeld* or similar compensations, resume their normal place in the community. Frequently too there are formalized procedures of reconciliation after the punishment of torts, meant to "cleanse the hearts of anger" and to accentuate the fact that the transgression has been disposed of. Similarly, primitive societies make little use of

any lasting stigma or ostracism. In no society is it altogether avoidable that the disgrace of a particular transgression should follow the culprit through life and overshadow all his contacts with his fellow men. But there can be no doubt that it is the advanced rather than the primitive society which tends to exploit this effect in consciously creating the outcast or his milder version, the *déclassé* individual. If in certain primitive groups stigmatization does occur, this is only part of another dilemma: for the same society would in other ways show its desire to rehabilitate offenders.[17]

VII

It will perhaps be argued that I could attribute such importance to self-regulation and especially to values simply held only because I neglected two crucial and ubiquitous controls—the diffuse sanctions implied in public criticism, shame or ridicule, and the institutionalized procedures of education. My answer would be that the two controls not only safeguard but also presuppose values and hence represent, not so much controls acting from outside upon the desired conduct, as phases in a circular process whereby values engender conduct and conduct reinforces values.

Voiced disapproval, of any kind or mood, may of course be merely a sign foreshadowing more compelling consequences (i.e., some concrete penalization, some loss, more or less severe, of normal chances). Disregarding this eventuality, the disturbing psychological effects of the disapproval, without which it would not be a sanction, presuppose that it cannot be evaded or disregarded. If, say, the shamefulness of adultery is not a matter of general agreement, the adulterer (assuming he is not punished in any other way) will always find some supporters among the public and be able to heed their approval rather than the disapproval of others. Above all, if he does not himself endorse the criticism, even tacitly or subconsciously, he can simply set it aside as irrelevant. In other words, blame, ridicule, or holding up to shame are controls only if they express commonly accepted values and correspond to the promptings of the Super-Ego. Admittedly, they also bring these promptings into the open; but this only means that they render them more acute. Indeed, it might be said that the strongest of these diffuse sanctions, shame, derives its very strength from the fact that it is an "exposure"—of inadequacies privately felt.[18]

As regards education, it is a truism to say that its widest efficacy (ignoring purely technical skills) lies in the inculcation of lasting attitudes and viewpoints, that is, of values subsequently to be simply held and followed. Without this, its force of control would be restricted to the actual period of tuition, when the educator employs rewards and punishment and other means of coercion; nor could there be any reason why a child taught a particular way of behaving should, as an adult, hand on this knowledge to his offspring, thus perpetuating the social order. Education, then, as I see it, merely provides occasions for self-regulation to emerge or re-emerge.

Needless to say, it is not the only such occasion. The notions of worthwhileness taught in family or school are reinforced in various ways throughout life—by religious doctrine, by the topics of art or legends, and by the symbolic dramatizations of ritual. But here it is difficult to distinguish between occasions and consequences or, if we call the former "controls," between these and the things controlled. The methods of education, the content of art, religious beliefs, though they demonstrate and enjoin precepts for conduct, are themselves forms of conduct and perpetuated only because they follow from these very precepts. We have, in the last resort, merely multiple instances of a given system of values, irreducible to any further regulative machinery save that circular process mentioned before, which seems inherent in any value system of real efficacy. The circularity goes even further; for any public act in harmony with the obtaining values becomes in some degree a model exhibiting their validity, and so adds to their efficacy. Whenever a person observes, say, exogamy or pursues blood revenge as demanded by the social norm, he not only executes a prescribed procedure but adds to the instances demonstrating that this procedure is indeed valid, which addition is as much a reinforcement of the moral values as is their explicit assertion or teaching.

For this widest circularity we find a physical

[17] Thus in the Trobriands, where the breach of exogamy is followed by ostracism (which may drive the culprits to suicide), blood revenge is mostly replaced by compensation (a "peacemaking price"). *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 115.

[18] Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950), p. 223.

model in what are now known as "feed-back" systems.[19] Taking the whole society to be the relevant system, any "output" of the intended kind—any conduct in accordance with the social norm—is partly returned as "input," i.e., as information sustaining further action of that character. The self-regulation implied in "linked incentives" and "multiple consequences" represents the exact counterpart. If the efficacy of values corresponds to a "positive feed-back," the other types of self-regulation correspond to "negative feed-back," controlling output through signalling errors—the errors being the forms of deviant conduct whose penalizing consequences force action back into the intended channels.

It will be seen, further, that guidance through values and penalization must operate consistently if the social order is to be maintained. The positive precepts of worthwhileness will normally reduce experimentation with unorthodox conduct. Yet if the latter does occur and fails to carry its own penalty, the underlying values will inevitably be weakened. This mutual agreement probably represents the most vulnerable area in any social system, for here theoretical convictions and practical experience must teach the same lesson. The frequent cry of morality collapsing nearly always refers to a situation where disregard for conduct taught and enjoined is no longer penalized through being demonstrably unsuccessful. The social order, if it is to survive, must then be refashioned, with values once more consistent with practical experience.[20]

We may add, finally, that the specific controls are equally fitted into the circularity of value systems. For the controls both follow from the value system and demonstrate it, since the punishments and rewards bestowed by societies are normally public acts. That circle is broken only when rulers, judges, legislators or, for that matter, teachers and moralists apply or preach a doctrine in which they themselves do not believe. They then stand outside the value system they wish to maintain, whoever they may be—a conquering minority enforcing laws fit for the masses, a group of Supermen *à la* Neitzsche, claiming to be "beyond good and evil," or a cynical *élite à la* Pareto or Sorel.[21] Here the question, "what is controlling the controls?" makes sense: the answer is—self-interest and calculations of political expediency. And here, if you like, we touch upon social controls in purest form, exercised from outside and unobscured as well as unaided by any self-regulation.

[19] See F. C. S. Northrop, ed., *Ideological Differences and the World Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 420; and Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Technology Press, 1948), pp. 13, 54, 114–115.

[20] Weber's and Tawney's familiar studies relating the Reformation to the rise of capitalism demonstrate such a process of reconstituted consistency, between a new rewarding economic practice and a value system hitherto deprecating wealth and material success.

[21] Cf. Karl Mannheim's summing up of Fascist ideology: "The superior person, the leader, knows that all political and historical ideas are myths. He himself is entirely emancipated from them, but he values them . . . because they . . . stimulate enthusiastic feelings . . . and are the only forces that lead to [the desired] political activity." *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), pp. 122–123.